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of litigation regarding the taxability of educational grants. Scholar-
ships and fellowships which carry any type of past, present, or future
work requirement as consideration for the grant would constitute
taxable income; the single exception would be that payments re-
ceived for work required of all candidates for a particular degree will
not be taxed if non-recipients of the grant are not paid for this service.
Additionally, scholarships and fellowships extended by a grantor
with any reasonable expectation of return would be taxable. 5 Only
those grants which reflect in all respects the grantor's disinterested
generosity would remain as excludable payments.78 This result, creat-
ing a standard both equitable and manageable, would provide tax-
payers and the Government alike with much-needed clear guidelines
for determining the taxability of educational grants.
DAVID SAMUEL DE JONG
THE FEE SYSTEM COURTS: FINANCIAL
INTEREST OF JUDGES AND DUE PROCESS
Fee systems are statutory forms of compensation for lower court
judges and justices of the peace. Under such statutes, the judicial
officer is compensated for his services from the fees levied in the
cases tried by him.' The basic constitutional objection to the fee
statutes is that they force a judge's compensation to be dependent to
some degree on the outcome of the cases he tries, and thus the judge
becomes financially interested in the case and loses the degree of
judicial impartiality required by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.2 At common law any interest in the outcome of
the proceeding, regardless of how slim, disqualified the judge on the
' This provision would expand upon the premise of the gift vs. compensation test
which made taxable payments resulting in a return to the grantor. None of the litiga-
tion brought under the 1939 Code concerned an indeterminable return to the grantor.
Thus, the result of the gift vs. compensation test in such a circumstance is only
speculative.
"Disinterested generosity does not serve as a bar to attaching conditions to a
scholarship or fellowship, if the grantor does not stand to profit from his payments.
For example, the tax-free status of a grant would not be affected by a limitation on
outside activity or by a requirement that a specific academic average be maintained.
'Reynolds, The Fee System Courts-Denial of Due Process, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 363
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds].
2Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
premise that no man should be the judge of his own case.' The United
States Supreme Court, more than forty years ago, outlawed one type
of fee system which created a "direct, substantial, personal, pecuni-
ary" interest in the judge.4 Twelve years ago the American Bar Asso-
ciation House of Delegates, responding to constitutional objections to
statutory fee systems, unequivocably took the position that all fee
systems must be eliminated.' The constitutional objections to statu-
tory fee schemes are well recognized and the attack on the fee sys-
tems by legal commentators has been so frequent, harsh, and univer-
sal' that it has been said that no added criticism seems necessary. 7
Despite this imposing array of opposition, fee systems still occupy
a prominent position in several states.' In view of the serious constitu-
tional objections to these compensation statutes, it is necessary to
explore the reasons why the fee systems remain in force and to dis-
cover different ways to challenge those fee statutes which violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. There are several
varieites of statutory fee systems9 and because the due process ques-
'See Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608); Reynolds, supra note 1, at 374
n.2; Note, 23 ARK. L. Rv. 277 (1969); Comment, 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 367 (1973).
'Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
'On August 9, 1962, the following resolution was passed by that body:
That the House of Delegates urge all state and local bar associations
in states where the fee system for compensating judges and justices
of the peace still exists, to undertake an active campaign, in coopera-
tion with the Standing Committee on the Traffic Court Program, to
eliminate the fee system.
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 373.
'For the most comprehensive study of the case against the fee system, see Judge
Foster's dissenting opinion in Application of Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789,
794 (1961). Articles combining a strong case against, the fee system with a complete
review of the previous authority on the subject include Reynolds, supra note 1, and
Note, The Justice of the Peace: Constitutional Questions, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 314 (1967).
'Holden, Justice Court Reform in Montana, 34 MoNT. L. REV. 122, 135 (1973).
'As late as 1964 over one-half of the states used the fee system to compensate lower
court judges. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 373-74 n.1. Among the states that continue to
use the fee system at this time are Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. It is possible that home rule
charters may provide for fee systems in some states not listed.
'In his lead article in the Oklahoma Law Review, note 1 supra, Robert H. Reynolds
identified five hybrids of the fee system. The Simple Fee System and the Salary Fund
Fee System as used herein, have been taken directly from his article. The other three
varities that he identifies are as follows:
ALTERNATIVE FEE SYSTEM Courts wherein the judges are com-
pensated in whole or in part by scheduled fees per case, which fees are
derived from the defendant, if convicted, or from the state or political
subdivision thereof in event defendant is acquitted.
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tions differ with the various types of fee schemes, each must be ana-
lyzed separately.
For functional purposes the fee systems can be classified into
three categories: (1) THE SIMPLE FEE SYSTEM-under this sys-
tem, the judge is paid all or part of his fees only upon conviction of
the defendant; (2) THE COMPETITIVE FEE SYSTEM-the judge
is paid a certain fee per case that he hears regardless of outcome, thus
setting the judges in competition with each other to hear as many
cases as possible; and (3) THE SALARY FUND FEE SYSTEM-
the judge is paid a set salary which is derived solely from a designated
fund consisting of fines and fees imposed by the judge.
The validity of the Simple Fee System was first challenged in
Tamey v. Ohio." In Tumey the defendant was charged with a viola-
tion of state liquor laws and was brought to trial before the mayor of
a small village. For his judicial duties, the mayor received a twelve
dollar fee for each criminal case in which he found the defendant
guilty. The Supreme Court invalidated the fee system because the
mayor "had a direct, personal, pecuniary interest in convicting the
defendant who came before him for trial, in the twelve dollars...
which he would not have received if the defendant had been acquit-
ted."" The Court held that this financial interest violated due pro-
cess. '
2
LIMITED ALTERNATIVE FEE SYSTEM Courts wherein the judges
are compensated in whole or in part by scheduled fees per case, which
fees are derived from the defendant, if convicted, or from the state or
political subdivision thereof in event the defendant is acquitted; pro-
vided that the latter form of compensation shall not exceed a maxi-
mum cumulative amount over a specified period of time.
PENALTY FUND FEE SYSTEM Courts wherein the judges are com-
pensated in whole or in part by scheduled fees per case, regardless of
conviction or acquittal, which fees are derived from a fund created and
maintained solely by fines and/or costs imhosed by said court in pre-
vious cases.
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 376-77.
1-273 U.S. 510 (1927).
"Id. at 523.
"The Court in Tumey found a second situation that independently violated due
process. As a judge, the mayor was responsible for conducting an impartial tribunal,
while his executive functions included responsibility for securing and maintaining the
finances for the village. Furthermore, one-half the fines from the mayor's court went
to the town, dependent on this income for its continued fiscal stability. The Court held
that the mayor's conflict of interest violated due process because a "situation in which
an official perforce occupies two. . . inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other
judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due process. ... Id. at 534. Accord, Dugan
v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). In this case the Court held that there was no violation of
due process where the judge of the lower court was also the mayor of the town. The
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Tumey case led to a predictable onslaught of litigation at-
tacking similar fee systems in many states. 3 However, while Tumey
did lead to the elimination of some fee statutes, 4 many state courts
refused to give the Tumey decision its full effect. Although the same
due process questions were often involved, some state courts ap-
peared to seize upon any factual difference between their state's
statutory scheme and the statute outlawed in Tumey to distinguish
the Supreme Court decision.' 5 The method most often utilized by
these state courts was to hold that the deprivation of due process in
the lower court could be cured by a right to a trial de novo in an
appellate court. 6 Other courts held that unconstitutional defects
caused by a fee system could be cured by procedural safeguards such
as a right to a change of venue 7 or a right to a trial by jury.',
However, the Supreme Court recently disapproved of this "proce-
dural safeguard" reasoning. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville," the
Court expressly rejected the contention that any unfairness at the
trial level could be corrected on appeal by a trial de novo:
distinction drawn was that the mayor did not have the primary executive responsibility
of the town and was "mayor" in name only. The Court said that if any interest had
been created it was too remote to violate due process standards.
"See cases cited in Note, 23 ARK. L. REv. 277, 278 nn. 7 & 8 (1969).
"Hulett v. Julian, 250 F. Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Ex Parte Baer, 20 F.2d 912
(E.D. Ky. 1927); Doty v. Goodwin, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 233 (1969); Rollo v.
Wiggins, 149 Fla. 264, 5 So.2d 458 (1942); Ex Parte Kelly, 111 Tex. Crim. 54, 10 S.W.2d
728 (1928); Williams v. Brannen, 116 W. Va. 1, 178 S.E. 67 (1935).
"sSee Ex Parte Lewis, 47 Okla. Crim. 257, 288 P. 354 (1930).
'6Hill v. State, 174 Ark. 886, 298 S.W. 321 (1927); State v. Schelton, 205 Ind. 416,
186 N.E. 772 (1933); State v. Gonzalez, 43 N.M. 498, 95 P.2d 673 (1939); Ex Parte
Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E.2d 132 (1942); Application of Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719,
359 P.2d 789 (1961). As authority for this doctrine the state courts relied on the folow-
ing statement by the Supreme Court in Tumey:
[T]he pecuniary interest of the Mayor. . . is not the only reason for
holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here ...
The trial is to be had . . . without a jury, without opportunity for
retrial and with a review confined to questions of law presented by a
bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set
aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should ap-
pear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake,
bias or willful disregard of duty by the trial court.
273 U.S. at 532-33. While many of the state courts held these lack of procedural
safeguards to be a sine qua non of an unconstitutional fee system, it is more likely that
this was simply additional reason for the holding of Tumey. See text accompanying
notes 17-20 infra.
17Application of Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961).
"Melikian v. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969); People v. Cheever, 370
Mich. 165, 121 N.W.2d 430 (1963); Ex Parte Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E.2d 132 (1942).
"1409 U.S. 57 (1972).
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This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fair trial in
the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that the incen-
tive to convict would be diminished by the possibility of rever-
sal on appeal. Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court
procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply be-
cause the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial ad-
judication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached
judge in the first instance. 0
The Court in Ward also refused to accept the argument that a right
to a change in venue could cure the constitutional defect. 2' While the
Court was not specifically called upon to decide whether a right to a
jury trial could cure the defect, the Court did state that due process
entitled a person to a neutral and detached judge.? The Simple Fee
Systems now appear to be vulnerable to an attack based upon the
principles enunciated in Tumey and Ward and should quickly be
eliminated as a means of compensating lower court judges.?
Although the Simple Fee System appears to violate due process,u
"Id. at 61-62.
21The Court explained:
[I]t is highly dubious that this provision [the right to a change of
venue] was available to raise petitioner's broad challenge to the
mayor's court of this village in respect to all prosecutions there in
which fines may be imposed. The provision is apparently designed
only for objection to a particular mayor "in a specific case where the
circumstances in that municipality might warrant a finding of
prejudice in that case."
Id. at 61.
The obvious problem with a change of venue statute is that it can only change venue
to a different lower court judge of the state who would be operating under the same
fee system.
"See Applicationof Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789, 794 (1961) (Foster,
J., dissenting). Judge Foster gave the following additional reason for refusing to hold
that a right to a jury trial would cure a due process defect:
It is difficult, however, to understand how such a privilege [right to
a trial by jury], even if exercised, would protect the defendant from
a partial tribunal. The justice, like any other judge, would still be the
presiding officer of the court, with the same powers to instruct the
jury, decide on admissibility of evidence, and rule on motions.
359 P.2d at 803 n.12. But see People v. Cheever, 370 Mich. 165, 121 N.W.2d 430 (1963).
The statute in this case provided that juries were to decide both law and fact.
"There are some statutes included in the classification of Simple Fee Systems
which operate more subtly than the statutes which provide a fee for the judge only
upon conviction of a defendant. Such statutes provide fees for ministerial functions,
such as fees for bond or recognizance, that the judge can perform only upon a convic-
tion. See State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W. Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74 (1971).
"Hypothetically, a Simple Fee System could be constitutional if the maxim de
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the question of whether the second type of fee system, the Competi-
tive Fee System, violates due process is not as clear. The major prob-
lem for an attorney arguing that the Competitive Fee System is un-
constitutional is to convince the court that the system itself creates
a financial incentive for the judge to convict criminal defendants and
hold against civil defendants. Several state courts have held that
Competitive Fee Systems do not create a financial interest violative
of due process because the judge receives his fees regardless of the
disposition of the case." However, when the workings of an entire
statutory scheme are unveiled, the financial interest that the system
potentially creates becomes apparent. The West Virginia statutory
scheme illustrates how a Competitive Fee System could provide fin-
ancial reward to the judge who convicts criminal defendants and
holds against civil defendants.
According to the West Virginia Code, justices of the peace are to
receive eight dollars for every criminal cases and five dollars for every
civil case heard,2 regardless of outcome. Thus, to maximize his earn-
ings, the justice must hear as many cases as possible. The number of
cases heard by an individual justice, and therefore the level of his
income, is necessarily dependent upon the number of civil plaintiffs
and criminal complainants who choose to utilize his court. Both the
civil plaintiff and the criminal complainant can choose to institute
an action in any of the justice of the peace courts located in the
county where the action must be brought." The state constitution
provides that each county will have a minimum of three justices of
the peace and a maximum of twenty.
9
minimis non curat lex (small things do not concern the law) were applicable. Chief
Justice Taft said in Tumey that a fee system would not violate due process if "the costs
usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim
de minimis non curat lex." 273 U.S. at 531. As a practical matter this is probably use-
less to one arguing to uphold any fee system. No cases have been found that have relied
on this maxim alone to uphold an otherwise unconstitutional system. For an example
of a small fee ($2.50) which has been held nevertheless to violate due process, see State
ex rel. Reece v. Gies, - W. Va. -, 198 S.E.2d 211 (1973).
nMelikian v. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Application of Borchert,
57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961); State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W. Va. 887,
180 S.E.2d 74 (1971).
"SW. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 17, § 11 (Michie 1972).
2W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 17, § 1 (Michie 1966). Additionally in civil cases the
justice receives other fees. However, some of these have been held unconstitutional
because they were dependent on a verdict for the plaintiff. State ex rel. Reece v. Gies,
- W. Va. -, 198 S.E.2d 211 (1973).
2 W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 2, § 1, § 4 (Michie 1966); W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art.
1, § 5 (Michie 1966).
2W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 27 (Michie 1973).
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In order to encourage complainants to institute actions in his
court, and to discourage them from forum shopping to find another
judicial officer more sympathetic to complaining parties, a justice
may feel compelled to please the people who bring cases to his court.30
Since in civil cases the plaintiff is pleased only when he wins, judicial
bias may be created in favor of plaintiffs. The potential for judicial
bias may be strongest where the complaining party, such as a large
creditor, 3' can create a considerable volume of judicial business.
In criminal cases brought before justice of the peace courts,
usually involving minor traffic violations, it is generally the arresting
officer who brings criminal defendants before the justice. A justice
may believe that some policemen become angry if the suspects that
they arrest are not convicted.32 This fear may be justified in some
cases when the police officer has a motive such as a statutory mone-
tary reward for seeking a high rate of convictions.? The justice, if
fearful that the officer may take his traffic violators to another court,
may have a tendency to become biased against all criminal defen-
dants.
34
Despite recognition of the theroetical possibility of bias, courts
"The bias that inheres in the Competitive Fee System has been recognized for over
half a century. In his dissenting opinion in Applicationof Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719,
359 P.2d 789, 799 (1961), Judge Foster gave the following quotation from Sir Frederick
William Maitland:
A great deal of our legal history is to be explained by the fact that for
centuries the judges were paid by fees; more business therefore meant
more money, and they had a keen interest in attracting cases to their
courts. F. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 135 (1908).
The bias that Maitland described has been repeatedly stated since then. See articles
cited in note 6 supra. For current evidence of judicial bias in favor of the people who
bring cases to the lower court judges see notes 63, 64 and 76 infra.
"'See note 67 infra. One such large creditor, Bert-Wolfe Ford, Inc., stated that it
provided one justice of the peace with 3 to 4 bad checks per month for criminal
warrants and about 30 per year for civil actions. Exhibit A from Hatfield v. Warner,
appeal docketed, No. 13393, West Virginia Supreme Court, July 23, 1973. At eight
dollars for every criminal case and five dollars for every civil case the business of this
one "customer" would amount to $486 for one justice of the peace.
2See note 76 supra; Application of Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789, 799
(1961) (Foster, J., dissenting); Reynolds, supra note 1, at 378; Note, The Justice of the
Peace: Constitutional Questions, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 314, 317-18 (1967).
31ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-1722 (Repl. 1968) (the sheriff's income is partially depen-
dent on both convictions of criminal defendants and judgments against civil defen-
dants from the justice courts); W. VA. CODE ch. 15, art. 2 § 27 (Michie, 1966) (upon
conviction $3.50 goes into a retirement and insurance fund for the police); See gener-
ally Note, The Justice of tje Peace: Constitutional Questions, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 314,
318 (1967).
3 1See note 32 supra.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
have refused to hold that the Competitive Fee Systems violate due
process.5 The grounds relied on by the courts have been either the
lack of proof of a financial interest36 great enough to violate due
process37 or the use of procedural safeguards to cure the defect.3 8
Since the Ward case would seem to have abolished the procedural
safeguard loophole, 39 an attorney has only to show that the Competi-
tive Fee System creates a financial interest in the judge great enough
to violate due process. A preliminary problem may be arriving at a
standard to be used to determine the degree of financial interest
necessary to violate the fourteenth amendment.
There has been no single standard uniformly applied in the cases
challenging the constitutionality of fee systems. The confusion as to
the proper standard to apply appears to have emanated from Tumey,
in which Chief Justice Taft seemed to invoke two entirely different
and contrasting standards. The Chief Justice first proclaimed that
due process would certainly be denied where the judge had a "direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in convicting a defen-
dant." This formulation was interpreted in some subsequent state
court decisions as establishing a lenient standard requiring proof of
considerable financial interest on the part of the judge before a viola-
tion of a defendant's due process guarantee could be found.4' These
state courts reasoned that the judge could have an interest in a case
provided the interest did not have a substantial and direct effect
upon the judge's personal, pecuniary gain or loss.4" There was no
denial of due process where the effect was merely "indirect, inciden-
tial, contingent or possible. 43 Similarly, other courts held that the
judge's financial interest must be certain to affect his decision,44 such
that in every case there would not be a fair and impartial trial.45 The
Competitive Fee System would not appear to violate these lenient
Melikian v. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Application of Borchert,
57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961); State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W. Va. 887,
180 S.E.2d 74 (1971); Ex Parte Lewis, 470 Okla. Crim. 72, 288 P. 354 (1930); Richard-
son v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 48, 4 S.W.2d 79 (1928).
2Melikian v. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969); State ex rel. Moats v.
Janco, 154 W. Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74 (1971).
31Application of Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961).
"id.; Melikian v. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
"See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
"-273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
"See notes 42-45 and accompanying text infra.
"See Ex Parte Kelly, 111 Tex. Crim. 54, 10 S.W.2d 728 (1928).
"Ex Parte Lewis, 47 Okla. Crim. 72, 288 P. 354, 356 (1930).
"Ex Parte Kelly, 111 Tex. Crim. 54, 10 S.W.2d 728 (1928).
"People v. Cheever, 370 Mich. 165, 121 N.W.2d 430 (1963).
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standards for judicial impartiality because the interest that the sys-
tem may create in some judges is both indirect and uncertain.
However, Chief Justice Taft also enunciated a second, more strin-
gent standard in Tumey. The majority opinion stated that "[e]very
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant"4 was a violation of due process. This is a more stringent
standard for judicial impartiality because it searches for any factor,
such as might be provided by a Competitive Fee System, which could
possibly create a bias in an average man as judge rather than requir-
ing proof of actual and considerable bias of the judge in a particular
case. Some of the interpretations that followed from this formulation
have been even more stringent; instead of looking at the effect a fee
system might have on an average man as judge, some state courts
looked to its potential effect upon the judge who would most easily
yield to temptation.47 Other courts have accepted any pecuniary in-
terest, however remote, as disqualifying a judge. 8
The recent Supreme Court case of Ward v. Village of Monroeville49
may have established the standard that now is to be used for fee
system cases. In Ward, the defendant, arrested and charged with two
traffic violations, was brought before the mayor of a small village in
Ohio. The mayor had the dual responsibility for an impartial tribunal
in his judicial capacity and the financial affairs of the village in his
executive capacity. The village to which a substantial portion of the
revenue of the mayor's court was directed was financially dependent
upon those funds. 0 There was no fee system in question in the case;
the mayor was paid a salary for his judicial duties.
Relying on its interpretation of Tumey, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that due process was not violated if the judge received no finan-
cial gain.'' On appeal, the Supreme Court adopted the second, more
stringent, standard expressed in the Tumey case to reverse the state
court decision and indicated that it felt such a rigid standard was
"273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). The Supreme Court confused the situation still further
after Tumey by saying the next year in the case of Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928),
that the judge's situation was too remote to warrant a presumption of bias toward
conviction. The fee system in that case was a Salary Fund Fee System and the judge
of the court was also the mayor of the town. Unlike the situation in Tumey however,
the mayor had no responsibility for the finances of the town.
"Rollo v. Wiggins, 149 Fla. 264, 5 So. 2d 458 (1942).
"State ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961).
"409 U.S. 57 (1972).
sold.
*'Village of Monroeville v. Ward, 27 Ohio St. 2d 179, 271 N.E.2d 757 (1971).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
consistent with the Tumey decision. Justice Brennan speaking for the
Court in Ward, explained that while the financial gain in Tumey, the
twelve dollar fee, was a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary in-
terest" that certainly violated due process, this formulation "did not
define the limits of the principle. '52 Instead, the majority opinion
proclaimed the proper test to be:
whether the. . . situation is one 'which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden
of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused.'
53
If this rigid standard,"4 which would seem to invalidate any statu-
5409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
5Id. quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
5'The standard that is used in the cases of disqualifications for other interests is
not uniform. A frequent problem occurs when the judge owns a partial interest, such
as stock, in a corporation that is involved in a civil or quasi-criminal proceeding before
the judge. See Comment, Judges-Disqualification to Act Because of Stock Interest,
22 So. CAR. L. REv. 261 (1970). In the federal courts the disqualification of judges for
a monetary interest in one of the parties in a case before him is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (1970) which states:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest. . . (emphasis added).
This standard is clearly not as high as the Supreme Court has required to meet due
process of law and there has been some criticism of this statute. See e.g., Note,
Disqualification of Judges, 86 HARv. L. REv. 736 (1973); Comment, Disqualification for
Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 U.S.C. § 455, 71 MICH. L. REv. 538 (1973).
The new A.B.A. Code of Judicial Conduct adopted on August 16, 1972 provides in part:
3c. Disqualification
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned including...
* . (c) he knows that he . . . has a financial interest
(3) For the purposes of this section:...
(c) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equita-
ble interest, however small...
The state court cases dealing with the disqualification of judges for a financial
interest in one of the parties before him provide support both for those who would urge
a stringent standard for judicial disqualification and for those who would have the
court use a very loose test. No prevailing pattern seems to run through the majority of
these cases. See Comment, Judges-Disquliaifcation to Act Because of Stock Interest,
22 So. CAR. L. REv. 261 (1970).
In cases where freedom of speech has interfered with the due administration of
justice, the Supreme Court has invoked loose standards for judicial conduct. In Craig
v. Haney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, had this to
say about the prevailing attitude of the Supreme Court toward judicial impartiality:
"[TIhis Court appears to sponsor the myth that judges are not as other men are, and
19741
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tory scheme offering a possible temptation to a judge to convict de-
fendants, is adopted then a mere showing of a theoretical likelihood
that a Competitive Fee System creates a judicial bias should render
the statute unconstitutional. Despite the fact that this theoretical
probability is well recognized,5 previous court decisions using a strin-
gent standard have required empirical evidence of prejudice to strike
down the statutes."' Such evidence has now been assembled in a
number of jurisdictions5 7 and its use elsewhere could lead to the
downfall of Competitive Fee Systems.
The most complete attack on the Competitive Fee System has
come in a trilogy of cases pending before the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals.' 8 The Competitive Fee System was brought into
question once before in West Virginia, and the state's highest court
expressly avoided a decision on its constitutionality because no evi-
dence on the issue was presented and alternative grounds were avail-
able to decide the case.59 In the three cases pending, however, there
is no lack of empirical evidence indicating prejudice against civil and
criminal defendants in the West Virginia lower court system. The
three cases challenge different sections of the fee system in West
Virginia. State ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet directly attacks the $5
fee for civil cases,' Sherman v. Robinson challenges the $8 fee for
that therefore newspaper attacks on them are negligible because they do not penetrate
the judicial armor." Id. at 396.
Justice Rehnquist seemed to invoke a very loose standard in his refusal to disqual-
ify himself in the recent case of Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). He had discussed
the district court opinion and stated his belief on the case before a Senate subcommit-
tee which was considering his possible confirmation. See Note, Disqualification of
Judges, 86 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1973).
5Note 35 supra.
"Note 36 supra. In the West Virginia case of State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W.
Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74 (1971), the court refused to rule on a $5.00 fee for hearing a
civil case saying: "There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the justice or
the arresting officer, in the trial of the offense charged against the petitioner, engaged
in any such practice or conduct." 180 S.E.2d at 79. In the same case the court said
that the standard used in West Virginia was that any interest, however remote, was
enough to disqualify a judge. Id. at 80.
57Note 80 infra.
"Hatfield v. Warner, appeal docketed, No. 13393, W. Va. Supreme Court, July
23, 1973; Sherman v. Robinson, appeal docketed, No. 13388, W. Va. Supreme Court,
July 9, 1973; State ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, appeal docketed, No. 13376, W. Va.
Supreme Court, June 11, 1973.
"'State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W. Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74 (1971). The court
held that a $.50 fee for preparing a transcript and a $2.00 fee for bond or recognizance,
being dependent upon the conviction of the defendant in a criminal case,disqualified
the justice. 180 S.E.2d at 79.
"State ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, appeal docketed, No. 13376, W. Va. Supreme
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hearing criminal cases,6 and Hatfield v. Warner attacks an $8 fee for
issuing arrest warrants in criminal cases.1
2
The evidence in the three cases is overwhelming in quantity and
shocking in quality. For example, in a deposition taken in connection
with the Hatfield case, the credit manager of a large creditor-plaintiff
that was a "client" of a justice of the peace indicated a common
practice in civil cases:
We use one Justice of the Peace for all our accounts. . . . We
switched to our present Justice of the Peace after he invited
us and discussed his procedure. We gave him two old accounts
and he did an excellent job of collecting them. . . [so] we
switched to him for all accounts, . . . We really appreciate the
fact that our present Justice of the Peace doesn't ask us to refer
him to other businessmen. Other Justices of the Peace, we
have done business with, asked us to be a reference for them
to other businesses.
63
Equally alarming is the evidence in Sherman v. Robinson which illus-
trates graphically the apparent prejudice in criminal traffic violation
cases. The arresting officer in that case made his arrest in the Union
District of Ritchie County, West Virginia, where there were two jus-
tices of the peace. Nevertheless, the officer took the defendant before
the justice of the peace in the Clay District of Ritchie County.64 The
petitioner suggested that this was because the justice in Clay District
would be more likely to convict than the justices in the district where
the alleged crime was committed. He supported his theory with an
exhibit showing that the Clay District Justice had earned $9,144.00
from criminal matters in the preceding 12 months while the two
justices in the Union District had earned $1,324.00 and $692.00.65
The Hatfield case included four depositions from large volume
civil plaintiffs and criminal complainants telling of their practice of
taking business to the justice of the peace who most often produces
a favorable result.6 In the same case, two former justices of the peace
Court, June 11, 1973.
"Sherman v. Robinson, appeal docketed, No. 13388, W. Va. Supreme Court, July
9, 1973.
"Hatfield v. Warner, appeal docketed, No. 13393, W. Va. Supreme Court, July
23, 1973.
6id. exhibit A. (emphasis added).
"Brief for Relator at 4, Sherman v. Robinson, appeal docketed, No. 13388, W. Va.
Supreme Court, July 9, 1973.
"Id. at 2.
"Exhibits A, B, C, D from Hatfield v. Warner, appeal docketed, No. 13393, W.
Va. Supreme Court, July 23, 1973. The following is a sampling from these exhibits:
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acknowledged the inherent and actual bias that the Competitive
Fee System produced.6 7 Perhaps the most outrageous manifes-
tation of the prejudice present in the West Virginia lower court
system is a circular from a justice of the peace to the police solicit-
ing their business for arrest warrants."8 The justice explained that
due to a Supreme Court ruling"9 the police department could not
write the warrants but that the justice was available to "perform this
service." The circular included the telephone number of the justice,
a detailed map showing the location of his office, a request that the
police "give this paper to anyone you wish to refer to this court," and
a listing of the justice's regular office hours. The circular explained,
I, Ms. Joan M. Boggess, Store Manager, Herbert Music Company
of St. Albans, Kanawha County, West Virginia, hereby state as fol-
lows:
In our business we handle bad check problems through the Jus-
tice of the Peace system, by a criminal warrant. It is my opinion that
a Justice of the Peace would be swayed to a degree by a large volume
client who could switch Justices of the Peace at his discretion.
One of the qualifications of a Justice of the Peace for us is that
he gets us a high rate of return on the bad checks we give him. The
Justice of the Peace will either get the store's money back or convict
the individual passing the bad checks. Also, if the Justice of the Peace
didn't give us a high rate of return on bad checks we would have to
look for another Justice of the Peace who would give us a high rate of
return.
Id., exhibit B.
I, Howard L. Spurlock, Security and Safety Office for K-Mart in
Charleston, West Virginia, hereby state as follows:
The K-Mart store in Charleston, West Virginia, receives approxi-
mately 200 bad checks per week. We run the checks through the bank
three times then we call the people and then we send a written notice.
If we receive no results at this point we send these checks to the main
office, then the main office turns the checks back over to us for collec-
tion. I use one Justice of the Peace that gives me the best results-the
highest amount of the store's money back.
Id., exhibit C.
"Exhibits E and F from Hatfield v. Warner, appeal docketed, No. 13393, W. Va.,
Supreme Court, July 23, 1973. Forrest Rucker, Mayor of Clendenin, former Justice of
the Peace of Kanawha County, former Constable in Kanawha County gave the follow-
ing statement: "I believe in the Justice of the Peace system. I do think that the average
Justice of the Peace with a big business would be swayed by a big store or collection
agency who could threaten to move their cases to another Justice of the Peace." Id.,
exhibit E.
"A copy of the circular is on file in the offices of the Washington & Lee Law
Review.
"The justice may be referring to Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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however, that the justice would be willing to "come to the office at
ANYTIME at the express request of ANY LAW enforcement agency,
if you will contact me at the office or at my home.
'7
The relators' briefs in these three West Virginia cases stressed the
fact that not only does the Competitive Fee System inherently create
a bias in the justices of the peace, but that the bias is so flagrant that
these lower courts are being operated more like businesses than im-
partial judicial proceedings .7 They emphasize that a judicial market-
place has been created for the thoughtful and selective plaintiff in
West Virginia and that the judicial officer has been reduced to a
judicial businessman.
7 2
There is evidence from other jurisdictions indicating that Com-
petitive Fee Systems inherently cause bias in the lower court judici-
ary wherever they exist. In Iowa, for example, a justice of the peace
was recently sued for false arrest after issuing an arrest warrant on
the charge of passing bad checks .7 Both the trial court and the Iowa
Supreme Court found that the justice had used his position in the
criminal process to run a collection agency to recover bad checks for
local businessmen.74 In addition to his fees in the bad check cases he
processed, the resourceful justice charged the local businessmen a 20
per cent commission on all monies collected through the justice's
impartial tribunal. 5 Evidence tending to show the possibility of bias
was revealed in a 1968 survey of the Nebraska lower courts.7 6 The fee
system in Nebraska was virtually identical to the present West Vir-
ginia statutory scheme. 7  The findings indicated that 67 per cent of
all cases were heard by only 15 per cent of the top volume judges and
"Note 68 supra.
"See Brief for Relator, Hatfield v. Warner, appeal docketed, No. 13393, W. Va.
Supreme Court, July 23, 1973; Brief for Relator, Sherman v. Robinson, appeal
docketed, No. 13388, W. Va. Supreme Court, July 9, 1973; Brief for Relator, State ex
rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, appeal docketed, No. 13376, W. Va. Supreme Court, June
11, 1973.
"Brief for Relator at 11, 14, Hatfield v. Warner, appeal docketed, No. 13393, W.
Va. Supreme Court, July 23, 1973.
nHuendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745 (Iowa 1969).
1"Id. at 748.
7Although the Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged that all the elements of a false
arrest case had been proven by the petitioner (the original defendant in the justice's
court) and that the justice's practice was morally reprehensible, the $2,500 trial court
judgment against the justice of the peace was reversed on the basis of the doctrine of
judicial immunity. For a criticism of this case, see Comment, Charity Begins At Home:
Judicial Immunity in Iowa, 58 IA. L. REv. 197 (1972).
76Dolan & Fenton, The Justice of the Peace in Nebraska, 48 NEB. L. REv. 459
(1969).
7Id. at 459, 467.
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that the top 26 per cent in the fees collected department received an
estimated 86 per cent of all fees.78 One Nebraska judge, reporting that
his predecessor had done a booming business in traffic cases, let it
be known that he would consider every case on its merits. As soon as
this was known, traffic patrolmen issuing citations went to "greener
pastures."79 There is similar empirical evidence in other states tend-
ing to show that Competitive Fee Systems create a financial interest
in the lower court judges who are compensated by these statutes. 0
It is difficult to predict the exact quantum of evidence that will
be required to prove that a Competitive Fee System violated due
process. If the evidence unquestionably shows that the system itself
creates a bias against all defendants and allows some judges to take
advantage of their judicial position for their own pecuniary gain, then
the Competitive Fee System would appear to violate due process no
matter which standard is adopted. Conceivably, however, many cases
could arise where the attorney will be unable to show evidence of bias
in his jurisdiction, if for no other reason than a lack of resources. In
7"Id. at 468.
"Id. at 469.
"A legislative investigation of the New Mexico justices of the peace disclosed that
state policemen had received $20 to $30 gifts from justices to induce the police to take
cases to those justices for trial. One justice reported the following in a letter:
'There are a few state police who write tickets by the hundreds, and a
J.P. may think, in some cases, that if the defendant is found innocent
the officer may get angry. If so ... the officer may take his hundreds
of citations elsewhere.'
Editorial, Payola in Court, 43 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y IV (1959).
A study was done of the six Oklahoma City justices of the peace courts, all of
which had concurrent jurisdiction. The criminal caseload ranged from 616 to 1,162.
Fines collected in the courts had a low of $4,284.00 and a high of $15,432.00. The fees
levied went from $2,252.91 to $4,234.00. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 378. Reynolds says
that these figures provide an "obvious conclusion." Id.
In his dissenting opinion in Application of Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d
789 (1961), Judge Foster gave the following report on the operation of the Washington
justice courts:
In a town of 2,600 people, one justice of the peace heard 1,244 criminal
cases and collected $3,928 .. .while another justice of the peace
in the same town heard two cases and collected $2. In other towns,
there were variations from $1,182 to $20; $1027 to $344. . . .Newspa-
per surveys report justices of the peace collecting an annual booty in
excess of the salaries of the judges of this court.
359 P.2d at 800.
Finally, in Alabama a federal district court reported evidence of excessive coopera-
tion between the police and the justices of the peace and found some evidence of
competition for business among the judges. Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F. Supp. 759
(N.D. Ala. 1968) aff'd mem., 393 U.S. 317 (1969).
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these cases the standard which is adopted by the court to test judicial
impartiality may be of critical importance.
Before the Ward case, state courts required proof of the actual
financial interest or bias that a fee system created in the lower court
judge before they would strike down the statute.'" However, where
the Ward standard is employed, an attorney has only to prove that
the Competitive Fee System is a situation that offers "a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the ac-
cused. ' ' 82 The defendant appealing from an adverse ruling in a lower
court would not have to show that the judge who initially heard his
case had a financial interest in the case or was biased against him. It
would appear that he would not even have to demonstrate evidence
of bias in the state lower court judiciary. Rather, the Competitive
Fee System would be on trial, and the attorney would only have to
show that the statute provides for the possibility of bias wherever it
operates. Any available empirical data showing the bias inherent in
the statutory system could be used to convince a court that the stat-
ute itself creates an unconstitutional temptation sufficient under the
Ward standard to deprive the defendant of due process.
There is very little empirical data on the effects of the third type
of fee system, the Salary Fund Fee System. Under this type of statute
the judge is paid a fixed salary from a designated fund comprised of
fines and fees levied by the courts.8 As long as the designated fund
is at a level well above the salary demands of the judges who are to
be paid from the fund, no financial interest would appear to be cre-
ated. However, if the salary demands exceed the amount of the fund,
the judges are not paid their full salary.'" Should this occur, the judge
would appear to have a financial incentive for convicting defendants.
The Supreme Court considered the validity of a Salary Fund Fee
System in Dugan v. Ohio," decided one year after the Tumey case.
Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, explained that the Tumey
holding did not apply to the Dugan facts because in Tumey "the
direct dependence of the mayor upon convictions for compensation
was found to be inconsistent with due process of law.""6 The situation
in Dugan was quite different:
'See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
"Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61 (1972).
8"See text accompanying note 9 supra.
'State ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961).
-277 U.S. 61 (1928).
"Id. at 64.
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The mayor [judge] . . . receives a salary which is not depen-
dent on whether he convicts in any case or not. While it is true
that his salary is paid out of a fund to which fines accumulated
from his court under all laws contribute, it is a general fund,
and he receives a salary in any event, whether he convicts or
acquits. There is no reason to infer on any showing that failure
to convict in any case or cases would deprive him or affect his
fixed compensation.
8 7
In Dugan, it seems that the major issue was whether an alleged con-
flict between executive and judicial functions violated due process.'
It appears the Salary Fund Fee System was not seriously questioned
by the petitioner, so that the above language was only dicta.
The better approach, however, seems to have been taken by the
West Virginia court in State ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn,89 which invali-
dated the Salary Fund Fee System in West Virginia on the basis of
due process objections. The court held the statute to be unconstitu-
tional because a justice was not paid if the contributed fines and fees
from his court were insufficient to pay his own salary. Although there
was no specific evidence that any lack of funds had occurred in West
Virginia, the court nevertheless struck down the system, saying that
"where a justice of the peace has any pecuniary interest in any case
to be tried by him, however remote, he is disqualified . . .,,0
There have been very few cases dealing with Salary Fund Fee
Systems. Future challenges to this type of fee statute should stress
the fact that the statute is a "situation" that could "offer a possible
temptation [to a judge to] forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant. . . ."I' Although empirical data is scarce, the
possibility does exist that a salary fund will shrink to a level insuffi-
cient to pay the judge and that he will become financially interested
in convicting defendants. In at least one case there was evidence
presented that a fine and forfeiture fund was not adequate to pay a
justice of the peace.12 In this instance, it appeared that the justice of
the peace had an interest in securing at least enough fines and fees
to cover his own salary.
Even if a court is convinced that bias exists in its lower court
system, it will not be easy to convince the legislature to adopt a
'11d. at 65.
'See notes 11 and 46 supra.
"146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961).
11121 S.E.2d at 612 (emphasis added).
"Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
"Hulett v. Julian, 250 F. Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
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replacement for the fee system. In Alabama, it took three chal-
lenges,93 all of which found a deprivation of due process in its justice
courts, to convince the legislature to abolish the fee system.94 Simi-
larly, in Arkansas, a holding that a Simple Fee System was unconsti-
tutional9 5 only prompted the legislature to replace it with a Competi-
tive Fee System.96
A court may be reluctant to hold a fee system unconstitutional
because of the fear that those salaried courts which exercise concur-
rent jurisdiction with the fee system courts will be burdened by the
additional workload from the cases formerly heard by the fee system
courts.97 Because of this reluctance to uproot an entire fee system for
compensating judges, the courts have shown a tendency to hold that
each defendant tried by a fee system court was denied due process of
law without holding the entire fee system unconstitutional and void. 8
Normally such a holding would be tantamount to declaring the whole
system unconstitutional, since every defendant could then appeal a
conviction. This does not occur, however, in fee system cases because
in virtually all such cases, the sentence in criminal or judgment in
civil cases will be so small as not to justify a costly appeal."
In this manner some fee system judges may perpetrate continued
'3Id.; Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ala. 1968) aff'd mem., 393
U.S. 317 (1969); Callahan v. Sanders, 339 F. Supp. 814 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The last case
barred police from instituting and the justices from hearing any criminal case in the
justice court.
"Callahan v. Wallace, 446 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972).
93Doty v. Goodwin, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 233 (1969).
"ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-1731.1 (Supp. 1971).
"Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956); Ex Parte Kelly, 111 Tex. Crim. 54,
10 S.W.2d 728 (1928); Richardson v. State, 109 Tex. 148, 4 S.W.2d 79, 80 (1928). In
West Virginia alone there have been five cases since Tumey which have declared the
workings of the fee system to be unconstitutional, yet the fee system still remains in
that state. In chronological order these are: Williams v. Brannen, 116 W. Va. 1, 178
S.E. 67 (1935); State ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961);
State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W. Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74 (1971); Keither v. Gerber,
W. Va. - 197 S.E.2d 310 (1973); State ex rel. Reece v. Gies, - W. Va.
198 S.E.2d 211 (1973).
"8Contra, Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956). In an earlier case, the
Kentucky court had interpreted the Tumey case as only recognizing a constitutional
right which one may or may not assert. Adams v. Slaven, 295 Ky. 135, 7 S.W.2d 836
(1928). However,in Roberts the court said that "[u]pon reexamining the opinion in
the Tumey case, we now conclude that the Supreme Court intended to, and did,
declare the entire system unconstitutional. 296 S.W.2d at 747.
"See generally Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956); Application of Borch-
ert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789, 803 (1961); Note, 23 ARK. L. Rxv. 277, 279 (1969).
See note 87 infra.
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injustices' 0 before their impartiality is ever questioned. A challenge
to the constitutionality of a fee system can utilize this potential injus-
tice to demonstrate the overwhelming need to issue decisions broad
enough to invalidate an entire fee system.'' The major justification
for the fee system is generally that the compensation of the judge
should be directly related to his workload so that the judge will have
an incentive to work fulltime as a judge. 0 2 Several of the states are
now operating under alternative systems that have both kept the
judges' income related to his potential workload and eliminated the
constitutional objections attendant with fee systems.' Thus it ap-
pears that there is no longer an administrative justification for fee
systems.
Among the best legislative alternatives to the fee system is the
Pennsylvania lower court compensation system. 04 In 1968 Pennsyl-
vania switched from a Competitive Fee System to a compensatory
statute for the lower court judiciary which provided that district jus-
tices of the peace would be paid $3,000 plus forty cents per resident
in the district. The ceiling on salaries was set at $14,000. A second
alternative is the system adopted by Illinois in 1959. The legislature
abolished the state's fee statute and substituted 1200 salaried judges
for the 4000 justices of the peace who had been compensated by the
'°See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
'One novel compromise solution to this problem was set forth by the Kentucky
court in Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1956). After holding the entire Kentucky
fee scheme to be unconstitutional, the court went on to say that because the immediate
abolition of the fee system in the absence of remedial legislation would cause great
public inconvenience and impede the prompt administration of justice, the order of
the court that no cases be tried before the justice of the peace would be delayed for
two years so that a replacement could be found. The court rationalized the retaining
of a statutory fee system that violated due process in this way:
[Ilt further appearing that reasonably adequate protection of the
constitutional right of fair trial, during a necessary transition period,
will be afforded through the long recognized right of a defendant to
demand that his case be tried by an impartial court, provided that
notice of this right is given to the defendant by the justice of the peace
before when he is brought to trial.
Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
'"'See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 386; Note, The Justice of the Peace: Constitu-
tional Questions, 69 W. VA. L. REV. 314, 316 (1967).
1"1See Application of Borchert, 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789, 797 (1961); Dolan
& Fenton, The Justice of the Peace in Nebraska, 48 NEB. L. REv. 457 (1969); Holden,
Justice Court Reform in Montana, 34 MONT. L. REv. 122 (1973); Kephard & Spivack,
A History of the District Justice System in Pennsylvania, 44 PENN. B.A.Q. 512 (1973).
" Kephart & Spivack, A History of the District Justice System in Pennsylvania,
44 PENN. B.A.Q. 512 (1973).
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fee system.' The judge's salary is commensurate with his workload
because the system is designated to be flexible, and the number of
cases assigned to a particular judge can be altered or additional
judges may be appointed, depending upon the caseload of the
courts. 06
In the last decade the number of fee systems has gradually dec-
lined. 01 In light of the evidence tending to show that such systems
inherently create a strong judicial prejudice against defendants, all
fee systems should now be abolished. Alternative compensatory stat-
utes which are both effective and constitutional are available to re-
place fee systems. The procedural safeguard loophole that once per-
mitted fee statutes to escape a holding of unconstitutionality has now
been closed by the Supreme Court in Ward v. Village of
Monroeville.M In the course of the decision, the Court also estab-
lished a stringent standard for judicial impartiality that invalidates
any fee system which could offer a "possible temptation" to an aver-
age man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict
a defendant.' 0 The empirical data that is available should be suffi-
cient to establish that the Simple and Competitive Fee Systems pro-
vide that "possible temptation" wherever such systems are used to
compensate lower court judges. Although the third type of fee system
will be the most difficult to eliminate, a strong argument for its
unconstitutionality can be made by combining the principles set
forth in Ward and State ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn."' Whether the
courts will respond and abolish all fee systems is still to be deter-
mined, but the necessary elements of a strong challenge to any fee
statute are now present.
PETER A. GORTON
'"Reynolds, supra note 1 at 387.
"OId.
"'Note 8 supra.
1409 U.S. 57 (1972).
'Id. at 60.
11146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961).
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